Post by Kevin on Sept 20, 2023 11:21:44 GMT -7
If God were so good, why would his grandest creation turn out so bad? In the atheist’s mind, even the most intelligently crafted redemptive plans can never hope to answer this single question. God can never redeem us enough to redeem himself from the initial fault of creating sinners. As the influential atheist Bertrand Russell framed it, “If I were going to beget a child knowing that the child was going to be a homicidal maniac, I should be responsible for his crimes. If God knew in advance the sins of which man would be guilty, he was clearly responsible for all the consequences of those sins when he decided to create man.” [Russell, “Useful Contributions,” 29.] Elsewhere, Russell mused, “If [God is omnipotent], nothing contrary to his will can occur; therefore when the sinner disobeys his commands, he must have intended this to happen.” [Russell, “Outline of Intellectual Rubbish,” 187.] Carl Sagan put it bluntly: “Why is there such a long list of things that God tells people to do? Why didn’t God do it right in the first place?” [Sagan, “God Hypothesis,” 237.]
The atheist thinks God ought to have prevented initially or ought to prevent each day the problem of moral evil. Of course, the question then becomes how to accomplish this. The possible interventions into the problem can be categorized as intervention into: All cases (A level), in the truly bad cases (B level), or merely on the conscience level for the willing (C level).
Since the atheist is clearly asking God to do more to fix the problem of moral evil than God has already done, the atheist is asking for either A- or B-level interventions. Practically, this means either constraints on humanity’s ability to commit certain acts or the thwarting of the acts once attempted. In other words, what the atheist is asking God for would mean a radically diminished human autonomy.
However, atheists are not at all shy about their affection for autonomy, the freedom to rule one’s own self. The atheist ends up rejecting as immoral the very interventions God would logically use to fix the problem of moral evil. When interventions approach, autonomy feels threatened, and this devotion comes to autonomy’s defense. Though the atheist decries the moral evil made possible by human autonomy, the atheist remains committed to valuing human autonomy.
It is interesting how the atheist responds when divine interventions into the problem of moral evil are actually proposed. Each of these is dedicated to a pair of interventions within God’s plan proposed to fix the problem of moral evil. What will the atheist say when, in the cause of virtue, he is asked to voluntarily surrender a measure of his autonomy? There are 10 potential interventions, all of which the atheist rejects (I can go into detail of each of these 10). Submission and Favor, Death and Faith, Guilt and Rules, Punishment and Pardon, Hell and Heaven.
The atheist thinks God ought to fix the problem of moral evil. However, the atheist also values human autonomy, a value that helps us understand why the atheist rejects any interventions into the problem of moral evil that would threaten that autonomy. Thus, he ends up calling for freedom from submission and favor, death and faith, guilt and rules, punishment and pardon, hell and heaven. Recall the three categories of possible ways God could fix the problem of moral evil:
A (“All”)—Forcible prevention of all moral evil
B (“Bad”)—Forcible intervention into the most egregious cases of evil
C (“Conscience”)—Voluntary intervention at the mental/spiritual level
From their writings, we learn that when the atheists say God should fix the problem of moral evil, they are suggesting A- or B-level interventions, both of which limit human freedom considerably. Yet in calling for freedom from the ten interventions, they rebuke God for merely C-level interventions. Astonishingly, they reject C-level interventions as too smothering, yet because God does not impose A- or B-level interventions, they charge him with neglect.
The contradiction is more pronounced than merely requesting help and then demanding freedom. As we have already mentioned, the ten interventions from which the atheist desires freedom are precisely the means by which the Christian God fixes the problem of moral evil. The interventions being rejected do, in fact, help to fix the problem of moral evil. Furthermore, atheists themselves know that such methods are effective in fixing the problem of moral evil. The only reason they might not seem effective enough, in the eyes of atheists, is that they are uncompromising in leaving freedom intact, something the freethinker should appreciate. In short, we will find that the atheist demands God fix the problem of moral evil while at the same time demanding freedom from the very methods God would use to fix it.
The first inconsistency lies in calling God too negligent for not fixing the problem of moral evil and then calling his interventions that go to fix moral evil too smothering. Thus, the atheist overrules the argument based on moral evil by arguing against the morality of divine interventions. In a second inconsistency, the atheist seems to reverse stances on the immorality of the divine interventions. Whereas he argues scathingly against the morality of these interventions at the divine level, somehow these interventions turn out not to be problematic at the societal level. This shows the atheist’s aversion to each of the divine interventions before summarizing the reversal of each attack when applied to the societal level.
The atheist thinks God ought to have prevented initially or ought to prevent each day the problem of moral evil. Of course, the question then becomes how to accomplish this. The possible interventions into the problem can be categorized as intervention into: All cases (A level), in the truly bad cases (B level), or merely on the conscience level for the willing (C level).
Since the atheist is clearly asking God to do more to fix the problem of moral evil than God has already done, the atheist is asking for either A- or B-level interventions. Practically, this means either constraints on humanity’s ability to commit certain acts or the thwarting of the acts once attempted. In other words, what the atheist is asking God for would mean a radically diminished human autonomy.
However, atheists are not at all shy about their affection for autonomy, the freedom to rule one’s own self. The atheist ends up rejecting as immoral the very interventions God would logically use to fix the problem of moral evil. When interventions approach, autonomy feels threatened, and this devotion comes to autonomy’s defense. Though the atheist decries the moral evil made possible by human autonomy, the atheist remains committed to valuing human autonomy.
It is interesting how the atheist responds when divine interventions into the problem of moral evil are actually proposed. Each of these is dedicated to a pair of interventions within God’s plan proposed to fix the problem of moral evil. What will the atheist say when, in the cause of virtue, he is asked to voluntarily surrender a measure of his autonomy? There are 10 potential interventions, all of which the atheist rejects (I can go into detail of each of these 10). Submission and Favor, Death and Faith, Guilt and Rules, Punishment and Pardon, Hell and Heaven.
The atheist thinks God ought to fix the problem of moral evil. However, the atheist also values human autonomy, a value that helps us understand why the atheist rejects any interventions into the problem of moral evil that would threaten that autonomy. Thus, he ends up calling for freedom from submission and favor, death and faith, guilt and rules, punishment and pardon, hell and heaven. Recall the three categories of possible ways God could fix the problem of moral evil:
A (“All”)—Forcible prevention of all moral evil
B (“Bad”)—Forcible intervention into the most egregious cases of evil
C (“Conscience”)—Voluntary intervention at the mental/spiritual level
From their writings, we learn that when the atheists say God should fix the problem of moral evil, they are suggesting A- or B-level interventions, both of which limit human freedom considerably. Yet in calling for freedom from the ten interventions, they rebuke God for merely C-level interventions. Astonishingly, they reject C-level interventions as too smothering, yet because God does not impose A- or B-level interventions, they charge him with neglect.
The contradiction is more pronounced than merely requesting help and then demanding freedom. As we have already mentioned, the ten interventions from which the atheist desires freedom are precisely the means by which the Christian God fixes the problem of moral evil. The interventions being rejected do, in fact, help to fix the problem of moral evil. Furthermore, atheists themselves know that such methods are effective in fixing the problem of moral evil. The only reason they might not seem effective enough, in the eyes of atheists, is that they are uncompromising in leaving freedom intact, something the freethinker should appreciate. In short, we will find that the atheist demands God fix the problem of moral evil while at the same time demanding freedom from the very methods God would use to fix it.
The first inconsistency lies in calling God too negligent for not fixing the problem of moral evil and then calling his interventions that go to fix moral evil too smothering. Thus, the atheist overrules the argument based on moral evil by arguing against the morality of divine interventions. In a second inconsistency, the atheist seems to reverse stances on the immorality of the divine interventions. Whereas he argues scathingly against the morality of these interventions at the divine level, somehow these interventions turn out not to be problematic at the societal level. This shows the atheist’s aversion to each of the divine interventions before summarizing the reversal of each attack when applied to the societal level.